O presente artigo aborda a ontologia de A. Sérgio, numa dupla vertente expositiva e crítica. Num primeiro momento enunciam-se os temas, o método e os critérios da abordagem, enquadrando a interpretação no próprio horizonte aberto pelo pensamento sergiano. Num segundo momento descobre-se a arquitectura do mundo tacitamente proposto pela sua gnosiologia e pela sua epistemologia idealistas, perspectivando-a como implícita "ontologia ideal". Num terceiro momento opera-se a análise crítica desta ontologia, segundo o duplo critério da consistência e da universalidade, retirando algumas (...) conclusões de âmbito genérico /// Le présente article aborde l'ontologie de A. Sérgio sous le double aspect d'exposition et de critique. En un premier moment on enoncerá le thème, la méthode et les critères de cette analyse, en insérant l'interprétation dans l'horizon même ouvert par la pensée de Sérgio. En un second moment, on découvre l'architectonique du monde tacitement proposé par sa gnoséologie et par son épistémologie idéalistes, en la montrant sous l'angle d'une ontologie "idéale" implicite. En un troisième moment, on passe a l'analyse critique de cette ontologie selon le double critère de la consistance et de l'universalité, pour tirer enfin quelques conclusions de caractère général /// This article begins with an indication of how the ontology of A. Sérgio may be approached. A description of its "ideal ontology" is then proposed on the basis of his idealist epistemology. Finally, a critical analysis of this ontology is attempted in order to evaluate its consistency and universality. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to characterise the concept of difference in Aristotle, both as a predicate of the genus and as a predicate of the species. We then try to classify these two dimensions of difference within the framework of the predicables. The general conclusion is that the differentia constitutiva is an essential predicate, logically analogous to the genus in this respect, while the differentia divisiva cannot be located within that framework because the predicables are implicitly thought by (...) Aristotle as forms of predication in which the predicate has an extension greater than, or equal to, the subject. (shrink)

The philosophical and philological study of Aristotle fragments and lost works has fallen somewhat into the background since the 1960’s. This is regrettable considering the different and innovative directions the study of Aristotle has taken in the last decades. This collection of new peer-reviewed essays applies the latest developments and trends of analysis, criticism, and methodology to the study of Aristotle’s fragments. The individual essays use the fragments as tools of interpretation, shed new light on different areas of Aristotle philosophy, (...) and lay bridges between Aristotle’s lost and extant works. The first part shows how Aristotle frames parts of his own understanding of Philosophy in his published, 'popular' work. The second part deals with issues of philosophical interpretation in Aristotle’s extant works which can be illuminated by fragments of his lost works. The philosophical issues treated in this section range from Theology to Natural Science, Psychology, Politics, and Poetics. As a whole, the book articulates a new approach to Aristotle’s lost works, by providing a reassessment and new methodological explorations of the fragments. (shrink)

Over time, several authors have argued that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the principles of science in general. In this article, I will present four arguments against this view and propose a deflationary view of the role of dialectic in this regard. Accord ing to this view, such a role consists only in the defence of common principles against potential eristic attacks. Keywords: Science, dialectic, first principles, common principles, proper principles.

Este livro não é uma sebenta nem um manual, mas um instrumento de trabalho. Como tal, não foi concebido para ser lido nem estudado, mas sim para ser utilizado, à medida das necessidades e interesses do estudante ou do iniciado em Filosofia Antiga.

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper aims to defend the unitarian position of Plato’s thought through an analysis of the Sophist in its relation with other middle and late dialogues. Contrary to those who consider that koinonia is an exclusive philosophical motif of the late period and represents a break with the dialogues of the intermediate period, the text seeks to defend how koinonia in the Sophist is not a rupture but a development and a consummation of Platonic positions sustained since the middle dialogues.

This article, The ontological argument in Plato: the problem of immortality, discusses the interpretation of Socrates’ last demonstration of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo as an ”ontological argument” and tries to refute this interpretation through an examination of the concept of immortality in Plato and its implications on the central relation soul/life. At the same time, it argues that the ontological argument should be seen as the very back-bone of Plato’s ontology, a point of view which will (...) be developed in a forthcoming paper. (shrink)

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics, where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence, that is of the genus (...) and the specific difference; 2) essential predication, that is either of the genus or of the differences ; 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents ; and 5) accidental predication. However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication. In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject. On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times. (shrink)

The deep relationship between the Phaedo and the Parmenides has long been recognised. However, this relationship is usually seen from the point of view of the alleged criticism in Plato's Parmenides of the theory of ideas contained in the Phaedo and in the dialogues which are doctrinally akin to it. For this reason, the thesis argued for in this article is a much rarer one: namely, that the Parmenides represents, within the unity of Plato's thought, the single moment in which (...) the theory of ideas proposed in the Phaedo is radically demonstrated and the notion of 'idea' becomes fully clarified. The objective of this paper is to investigate both dialogues from the point of view of the notion of 'idea' that they implicitly propound, taking into consideration two crucial passages of the Phaedo and the Parmenides whose significance, although frequently ignored, permits overall such a notion to be established. Through this commentary it will then be possible to attain, as its final goal, an enlightening understanding of the nature of platonic 'idea'. But another consequence follows from it: the preclusion of the common, yet particularly misleading, translation of είδος by "Form". (shrink)

Resumo No segundo capítulo das Categorias, Aristóteles introduz um esquema conceptual de acordo com o qual, recorrendo a dois únicos critérios, “estar num sujeito” e “dizer-se de um sujeito”, é possível distribuir a realidade por quatro tipos de entes: as substâncias individuais, que nem estão num sujeito nem se dizem de um sujeito; as substâncias universais, que se dizem de um sujeito, mas não estão num sujeito; os acidentes individuais, que estão num sujeito, mas não se dizem de um sujeito; (...) e os acidentes universais, que estão num sujeito e se dizem de um sujeito. O problema coloca-se ao nível do terceiro tipo de entes, os acidentes individuais, em virtude, em particular, do modo como são definidos no texto, a saber, como algo que “não pode ser separadamente daquilo em que está”. Ora a importância desta cláusula, e, portanto, da sua correcta interpretação, vai muito para além de uma simples decisão em matéria textual ou mesmo doutrinária, se a restringirmos ao passo e à questão em apreço. Nela, joga-se todo o sentido que Aristóteles deseja atribuir à individualidade das inerências e, através dela, o modo como é por ele concebida a distinção ontológica entre substâncias e acidentes individuais, enquanto tipos diversos de itens individuais. Este, pois, o objecto do presente estudo: apreender o sentido e o fundamento da distinção entre substâncias e acidentes individuais em Aristóteles, a partir de uma análise do estatuto das inerências no segundo capítulo das Categorias. Palavras-chave : acidente, Aristóteles, Categorias, individual, inerências, substânciaIn the second chapter of Categories, Aristotle introduces a conceptual scheme in accordance to which, using only two criteria, “being in a subject” and “said of a subject”, it is possible to distribute reality over four types of beings: individual substances, which are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject; universal substances, which are said of a subject but are not in a subject; individual accidents, which are in a subject, but are not said of a subject; and universal accidents, which are in a subject and are said of a subject. The problem arises with the third type of entity, individual accidents, due to the way they are defined in the text, namely as something which “cannot exist separately from what it is in”. The importance of this clause, and therefore of its correct interpretation, goes far beyond the mere decision on textual or even doctrinal matters, if restricted to the passage and to the question under consideration. What is at stake here is the significance that Aristotle wishes to attribute to the individuality of inherences and, through that, the way in which the ontological distinction between individual substances and individual accidents – that is to say, between primary substances and their accidents as diverse types of individual items – is conceived by him. Here, then, is the scope of this paper: to grasp the meaning and the rationale of the distinction between individual substances and individual accidents in Aristotle, based on the analysis of the statute of inherences in the second chapter of the Categories. Keywords: accident, Aristotle, categories, individual, inherences, substance. (shrink)

La finalidad de este artículo es explicar, mediante algunos testimonios significativos, de qué manera penetra en España el aristotelismo y cómo esta penetración del nuevo pensamiento aristotélico en Europa pone de manifiesto un permanente conflicto entre Edad Media y Renacimiento, fundamentalmente en España, donde el redescubrimiento y uso de las autoridades antiguas constituye a menudo un importante problema teórico. El autor muestra alguna de estas dificultades en varios dominios (filosofía, ciencia, literatura).